Two formal bodies, a bilateral trade board and a bilateral investment board, have been proposed by Henry Huiyao Wang as a practical way to stabilise U.S.-China competition ahead of President Donald Trump’s planned May 2026 visit to China. Wang, founder and president of the Beijing-based Center for China and Globalization, made the proposal in public remarks and interviews in April and May 2026. He argues the goal should be to institutionalise a managed form of interdependence rather than try to rewind to pre-2018 engagement. The May visit, Wang and other participants say, could provide the signalling and momentum to begin structured talks on those mechanisms.

Henry Huiyao Wang put the idea bluntly in a series of appearances and interviews in April and May. He told audiences that President Trump’s planned May 2026 China visit offers a “rare window” to turn ad hoc diplomacy into formal arrangements that can stabilise competition and allow cooperation on crises such as Ukraine and the Middle East.

Wang's pitch for managed interdependence

Wang, who founded the Centre for China and Globalization, argues the most consequential outcome of a Trump-Xi meeting wouldn't be a return to the full engagement that existed before 2018. Instead, he said the practical route is to build institutional mechanisms to manage competition. He recommended establishing a bilateral trade board to identify mutually beneficial exchanges, and a bilateral investment board to coordinate cross-border capital flows and help avoid disputes. He described the investment board as a “brilliant idea” and framed both bodies as pragmatic tools to reduce risk.

At the Semafor World Economy Summit on April 24, where he was the sole Chinese speaker, Wang told the audience the bilateral relationship was “starting to relax a bit.” He used that platform and later television and podcast interviews to press the same idea: the facts of trade and supply-chain ties are more durable than the rhetoric about decoupling and de-risking. Wang said those economic links make it sensible to create formal channels to manage disagreements rather than pretend interdependence can be undone.

He also argued the current U.S. Administration is inclined to place economic interests above ideological confrontation, which he sees as opening practical space for engagement if both sides pursue concrete mechanisms for crisis management and risk reduction. Wang has led delegations of CCG experts to the United States, including an April 2026 field research trip and earlier scholar delegations in 2025, and he has used those exchanges to press for problem-solving approaches in both closed-door and public meetings.

Pre-summit steps and political gaps

Reporting around the pre-summit negotiations points to real preparatory steps that Wang referenced. Sources said high-level trade discussions and signalling from Beijing have opened space for talks. In one reported diplomatic move, Vice Premier He Lifeng travelled to Switzerland to meet U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on May 7, 2026.

Mastheads

Geneva also hosted a set of senior-level meetings intended to reset engagement channels and establish lines for future negotiations, according to pre-summit accounts.

Those steps have encouraged some business and policy voices to push for institutional mechanisms such as trade and investment boards. U.S. Trade officials, however, publicly downplayed readiness to adopt an investment board at this stage. That divergence captures the political gap Wang is trying to bridge: momentum exists at technical and business levels, while formal political endorsement for new bodies remains contested.

Wang and his supporters say formal mechanisms would do more than smooth bilateral relations. They expect a handshake between leaders, coupled with agreements to start structured talks, to send stabilising signals to markets and global investors. Wang has emphasised signalling repeatedly, arguing that concrete appointments and renewed exchanges could pave the way for substantive negotiation. He pointed to recent appointments, such as naming a Chinese chief trade negotiator, as potential catalysts for those talks.

There are some contested claims inside Wang’s public argument. He told the Semafor audience that bilateral trade increased almost 20 percent from Trump’s first term to the present, and that China’s share of trade with the United States fell from about 20 percent to roughly 12-13 percent.

Those figures appear only in his Semafor remarks and the Semafor transcript. That single-source status has been noted in pre-summit coverage and suggests parts of the quantitative case aren't yet triangulated.

Wang’s organisation, the Centre for China and Globalization, was founded in 2008 as a bridge organisation aimed at connecting Chinese policymaking and global audiences. CCG says it's largely privately funded, hosts numerous public events, and publishes research and books to shape policy debates. Wang has served in advisory roles to Chinese government bodies, including work with the State Council, and he presents the delegations and exchanges he leads as part of a sustained track of scholar and business diplomacy between China and the United States.

Observers note the political feasibility of new, binding bilateral bodies will depend on how far leaders are prepared to commit in public statements during the May summit. Some U.S.

Officials have signalled caution, while Chinese public commentary and Wang’s advocacy suggest Beijing is open to at least starting structured talks. The result may be modest first steps rather than sweeping institutionalisation.

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The immediate next milestone is President Trump’s planned visit to China in May 2026, which Wang and other participants say could produce the signalling and start the structured talks on trade and investment mechanisms.

This article was created with AI assistance.